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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Should this Court reverse the Utah Court of Appeals
and create a public policy exception to the Rule that
contracts authorizing attorney's fees are strictly interpreted?
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
Attached hereto as Attachment 1 is a copy of the
Order of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
the trial court denying an award of attorney's fees to
Geraldine Baker Nelson.
JURISDICTION
The respondents acknowledge that this Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-2 and
Title V of the Rules of this Court.
CONTROLLING STATUTES
No statutes control this matter.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the trial court, the Respondents, Paul and Penny
Lochhead, sued the Defendant, Geraldine Baker Nelson,
alleging that she had breached specific written warranties
containpd in thn Uniform Roal F.st-af-p Con*-rart.

Th^ matter

was tried to a jury which determined in its special
verdict, attached as an Exhibit to Appellant's Petition
for Writ of Certiorari that there was not a breach of
-1-

contract or warranty by Mrs. Nelson.

The trial court

ruled that since there was no breach, Mrs. Nelson did not
fall within the coverage of the attorney's fees provision
contained in the Uniform Real Estate Contract and denied
her fee petition.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.
ARGUMENT

The reason the Court of Appeals denied Nelson's
appeal and affirmed the trial court is evident from
Nelson's argument.

Nelson's argument is essentially that

as a matter of public policy, the Court ought to abandon
the American rule on attorney's fees and engraft an
all-encompassing attorney's fees provision onto each
contract where there is reference to attorney's fees in
any provision.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court,
relied upon its holding in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken,
764 P.2d 985 (Utah App. 1988).

In Dixie State Bank, the

Court of Appeals relied upon prior holdings of this Court
in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) and
Trainer _y._Cushjngf 680 P.2H 8S6 (n» ah 1984).

All nf

those cases star 3 for the proposition that attorney's fees
provisions will be strictly construed.
-2-

The position Mrs. Nelson would have this Court take
is that the Courts should remake parties1 contracts for
them if they fail, in retrospect, to get appropriate
language in the contract in the first instance.

It is of

note that the Uniform Real Estate Contract in this
particular case was prepared by and closed at a title
company.

Had Mrs. Nelson wished to have language in the

contract other than she had, she could very easily have
asked the title officer to resolve those problems for her,
she did not.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals properly relied on current Utah
law enunciated by the Utah Court of Appeals in reliance
upon this Court's decisions.

Nelson's Petition for

Certiorari should be denied.
DATED this A ^ day of June, 1989.

espondents
-3-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy o
foregoing document was deposited in the United States
Mail, postage prepaid, on the

/

day of June, 1989,

addressed to the following:
Steven F. Alder
220 East 3900 South
Suite 16
Salt Lake City, Utah
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ATTACHMENT NO. 1

F ILED
y AP§&//-,?C?

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

'

.. j

V

Paul R. Lochhead and Penny
Lochhead,
ORDER
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No. 880508-CA

v.
Geraldine Baker Nelson,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Davidson, Jackson and Orme (On Rule 31 Hearing).

This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31, Rules
of the Utah Court of Appeals.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the judgment of the trial court
denying an award of attorneys' fees to Geraldine Baker Nelson
(Case No. 880508-CA) is affirmed, and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the judgment of the trial court
on Geraldine Baker Nelson's counterclaim for taxes (Case No.
880568-CA) is affirmed.
DATED this

/3

day of April, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of April, 1989, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the
following:
Steven F, Alder
Cheryl M. Brower
Attorneys at Law
220 East 3900 South #16
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Robert H. Wilde
Attorney at Law
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490
Midvale, UT 84047
Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup
Third District Court
Salt Lake County
#C86-506

/

Julia C. Whitfield
Case Management Clerk
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Telephone: (801) 255-6000
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PAUL R. LOCHHEAD- and PENNY
LOCHHEAD,
:

Case No. 880508 CA

Plaintiffs/Respondents,
vs.
GERALDINE BAKER NELSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On a special verdict the jury decided against the
Lochheads.

Nelson sought attorney's fees for work

performed in the case. The trial court ruled that fees
were not available except as they were related to the
prosecution of Nelson's counterclaim alleging a breach of
the Uniform Real Estate Contract for failure to pay reaJ
estate taxes. Nelson appeals that ruling.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Nelson asserts that the trial court erred in not
awarding her attorney's fees for time spent in defending a
breach of contract claim, a fraud claim, and for time
spent in prosecuting a slander of title action which was
withdrawn prior to trial.

The Lochheads believe that

the trial court was correct in allowing attorney's fees
only where authorized by statute or contract and that the
contracts authorizing attorney's fees are strictly
interpreted.

Further, there was insufficient evidence

presented to the trial court to allow the award of
attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Lochheads (Plaintiffs) sued Geraldine and Keith
Nelson (Defendants) for breach of contract under a Uniform
Real Estate Contract the parties had executed wherein the
Lochheads were buyers and the Nelsons were sellers, (R
2-19).

The Lochheads also included a cause of action

alleging fraud, (R 6 ) . During the course of the
litigation Keith Nelson filed bankruptcy and was removed
as a Defendant in the action.

Later the Lochheads filed

a Lis Pendens, (R 144). Mrs. Nelson then filed a
counterclaim alleging that the Lis Pendens slandered hr>r
title, (R 165). Prior to the commencement of trial, Mrs.

-2-

Nelson withdrew her counterclaim for slander of title, (R
307).

The matter was tried to the jury.

The jury

answered special interrogatories which were submitted to
them, having been prepared by Mrs. Nelson's counsel.

The

jury found that there was no breach of the contract, (R
267, 294, 295).
At a post-trial hearing Mrs. Nelson's counsel
testified at some length about the attorney's fees which
had been incurred in her representation, (R 315-341).

In

that testimony he broke down his attorney's fees based
upon time allegedly used in prosecuting his tax
counterclaim, but failed to further break down the
attorney's fees.

In other words, there was no accounting

of attorney's fees showing time spent defending the
Plaintiffs' contract claim as opposed to defending the
Plaintiffs' fraud claim, nor was there any brejik down
showing time involved in prosecution of the slander of
title counterclaim.

The time was essentially identified

in two categories, tax counterclaim time and other time.
The tria] court awarded Mrs. Nelson $480.00 in attorney's
fees and she appealed, claiming that she was entitled to
$14,000.00 in fees.

-3-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

There are no attorney's fees available to Mrs.

Nelson for defending the fraud complaint or asserting the
Lis Pendens counterclaim because there is no contractual
or statutory basis for these attorney's fees.
2.

There are no attorney's fees available to Mrs.

Nelson for defending the breach of contract allegation
because there is no statutory or contractual basis for
these fees.

The contractual provision awards attorney's

fees in the event of a default and the jury specifically
found there was no default.
3.

There is insufficient evidence upon which to

base an award of attorney's fees.
ARGUMENT
I.
THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING THE FRAUD COMPLAINT OR
PROSECUTING THE LIS PENDENS COUNTERCLAIM.
It has long been established law in Utah that
attorney's fees are available only if there is a statutory
or contractual authorization for fees, Utah Farm
Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66
(Utah 1981).

At the evidenciary hearing on Mrs. Nelson's

claim for attorney's fees, counsel was asked, on
cross-examination, if he was aware of a statutory or

-4-

contractual authorization for attorney's fees on the fraud
or slander of title issues.

His response was negative.

Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56, as in effect at the time
this matter was tried, authorized attorney's fees for
actions brought in bad faith.

The Court specifically

found that the fraud allegations were not brought in bad
faith belying Nelson's claim, at page 8 of her brief, that
Lochheads action was frivolous.

The slander of title

counterclaim was voluntarily dropped by the Defendant and,
accordingly, cannot be the basis for attorney's fees
because there were no findings which would indicate that
the Lis Pendens was filed inappropriately, in bad faith,
nor did Mrs. Nelson prevail on that issue.

In short,

there is no basis in statute or contract for an award of
attorney's fees on either of those elements of this
lawsuit.
II.
ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR DEFENDING THE
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM ASSERTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS.
Paragraph 4 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract at
issue in this lawsuit provides,
"Attorney's Fees. Both parties agree that,
should any party default in any of the
covenants or agreements contained herein, the
prevailing party in litigation shall be
entitled to all costs and expenses, including
a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise
-5-

or accrue
contract,
property,
hereunder

from enforcing or terminating this
or in obtaining possession of the
or in pursuing any remedy provided
or by applicable law."

The fact that there happens to be an attorney's
fees provision in the contract does not mean that
any party prevailing in a lawsuit automatically is
entitled to attorney's fees.

This is exactly the

same issue which was raised in Trayner v. Cushing,
688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).

There the Court

said,
"Counsel for both parties cite and discuss
cases awarding attorney's fees to the
'prevailing party' or to the party 'not in
default'. Neither of these phrases was used
in the agreement before us. These parties
have agreed instead to the payment of
attorney's fees in an action brought to
'enforce' the agreement 'or any right arising
out of a breach thereof."
Since Cushing this principle has been upheld no less
than twice by this court.

In Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714

P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986) and in Cooper v. Deseret
Federal Savings & Loan Association, 86 Adv. Rep. 26, 28
(Utah App. 1988).

Cooper was decided after the decision

in the court below and cited by Mrs. Nelson in her
docketing statement but not in her brief.
The contract allows attorney's fees "should any party
default".

The jury found that no party defaulted.

-6-

The

attorney's fees authorized by the contract are those for
". . . enforcing or terminating . . . obtaining possession
of the property . . .

or pursuing any remedy . . . "

Mrs.

Nelson's attorney's fees were not expended in any such
pursuit.
The extremely clear point set forth by the Cushing
line of cases is that attorney's fees language in
contracts will be strictly construed.

That strict

construction prevents Mrs. Nelson from claiming more
attorney's fees than the court has awarded.
III.
THERE WAS INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ANY AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The evidence provided by Mrs. Nelson in her quest for
attorney's fees was in the nature of testimony provided by
her attorney and an exhibit consisting of his bills to
her.

Noteably a transcription of that testimony was not

provided by Nelson in asserting her position before this
Court.

Neither the bills nor Nelson's counsel's testimony

broke his time down into the areas of representation
covered.

It is impossible from either his testimony or

from the exhibit to identify time which dealt only with
the defense of the breach of contract claim.

That claim

is the only claim whichr by any remote stretch of the
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imagination, could support an attorney's fees award.
Though there is no justification for an award of
attorney's fees on that claim either as argued in the
preceding section.

In Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622,

624 (Utah 1985) the Supreme Court said,
" . . . a party who is entitled to
attorney's fees costs and fails to ask
for all of them in the trial phase of the
case, or fails to adduce adequate
evidence in support of a finding of
reasonable attorney's fees, waives any
right to claim those fees later."
In order to meet this burden Mrs. Nelson would have
had to have adduced at the hearing evidence to allow the
trial court to answer and make findings of fact on four
questions.
"1.

What legal work was actually performed?

2. How much of the work performed was reasonably
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter?
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with
the rates customarily charged in the locality for
similar services?
4. Are there circumstances which require
consideration of additional factors, including those
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?"
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5
(Utah App. 1988)
In Cabrera, at 624, the Court said,
"Reasonable attorney's fees are not measured
by what an attorney actually bills, nor is
the number of hours spent on the case
determinative in computing fees . . . .
The
-8-

Court may consider, among other factors, the
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency
of the attorneys in presenting the case, the
reasonc bleness of the number of the hours
spent on the case, the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar services,
the amount involved in the case and the
result attained, and the expertise and
experience of the attorneys involved."
No evidence was adduced in the hearing which would
have provided a basis for a finding on the majority of
the Cabrera issues.
Even if there were, by some stretch of the
imagination, an entitlement to fees, there is no adequate
evidence which would allow the award of those fees or
which would make it possible for the court to determine a
reasonable fee.
IV.
UTAH PRECEDENT SUPPORTS LOCHHEADfS POSITION.
Nelson urges this court to adopt positions taken, on
various issues, by courts in Texas and Colorado as well
as in dissenting and concurring opinions in Utah cases.
Utah case law clearly covers all the issues in this
matter, as shown above.
In Dixie State Bank, supra, at 5, this Court
addressed all of the matters at issue in this case in
Lochheads favor.
In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if
authorized by statute or by contract. [citation
omitted] If provided for by contract, the award of
-9-

attorney fees is allowed only in accordance with the
terms of the contract. [citation omitted] [Where
the] contract was not subject litigation, contract
provision allowing attorney fees was not applicable
. . . . Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is
in the sound discretion of the trial court,
[citation omitted] and will not be overturned in the
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion,
[citation omitted] However, an award of attorney
fees must be supported by evidence in the record,
[citation omitted] Award of attorneys fees must
generally be made on the basis of findings of fact
supported by the evidence and appropriate
conclusions of law. [citation omitted] Since party
did not present evidence on issue of attorney fees
at trial, trial court did not commit error in
declining to make an award."

The Lochheads suggest that Dixie State Bank is
dispositive of all issues in Nelson's appeal other than
Lochheads' claim for attorney fees on appeal.
V.
LOCHHEADS SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR ATTORNEY FEES IN
DEFENDING THIS APPEAL.
Lochheads previously filed a motion seeking attorney
fees in this action-

In that motion they cited Nelson to

the very clear case law argued in the preceding sections
of this brief.

Since that motion, but before Nelson filed

her brief, in this action this court decided Dixie State
Bank, supra, which shows that Lochheads position
represents the law in Utah.

Despite this Nelson

persisted.

-10-

Nelson has failed to provide this court with a
transcription of her counsel's testimony at the hearing
on attorney fees despite the fact that both Cabrera and
Dixie State Bank require such evidence in order for this
court to rule on the reasonableness of the attorney fees
award, or lack thereof below.

Without such a record

Nelson has absolutely no hope of prevailing on appeal.
Lochheads1 claim for attorney fees on appeal is
governed by Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals.

That rule was interpreted in O'Brien v. Rush,

774 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987)
"For purpose of Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals we define a "frivolous appeal" as
one having no reasonable legal or factual basis as
defined in Rule 40(a) . . . .
It may be argued that the imposition of this
definition creates a lesser standard than that
created by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1981) which
requires lack of good faith. We do not disagree.
However, since a party has already been to court
once and has had the benefit of one ruling, the
decision to appeal should be reached only after
careful consideration by the party and counsel."
Reading Rule 33(a) in conjunction with Rule 40(a)
shows that the "no reasonable legal or factual basis"
requirement is a disjunctive requirement, i.e., having
either no legal basis or no factual basis renders an
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appeal frivolous.

Certainly an appeal on a well reasoned

legal argument with no factual foundation is frivolous as
is a set of facts showing substantial injury with no legal
basis for recovery.
In this case the Utah law to support Nelson's
argument is clearly lacking.

Dixie State Bank and its

predecessors all hold that attorney's fees provisions in
contracts will be strictly construed.

The appeal is

legally frivolous.
Nelson's failure to identify at trial those items of
work which might, by a broad stretch of the imagination,
support an attorney fees award and her failure to provide
this court with a transcript make the appeal factually
frivolous.
These legal and factual defects in Nelson's appeal
require that Lochheads be awarded their attorney fees on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
There was no legal basis for the attorney's fees
Nelson now seeks.

The trial court below was correct in

its assessment of the case.

The Lochheads should be
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awarded their attorney's fees for having to defend this
frivolous appeal.
DATED this

day of November, 1988.

ROBERT H. WILDE
Attorney for Respondents
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to be
deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to:
Steven F Alder
220 East 3900 South
Suite 16
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Attorney for Appellant
on this

day of November, 1988.
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